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Our understanding of mind wandering (MW) has dramatically increased over the past 
decade. A key challenge still facing research is the identification of the processes and 
events that directly cause and control its occurrence. In the present study we sought to shed 
light on this question, by investigating the effects of verbal cues on the frequency and 
temporal focus of MW. To this aim, we experimentally manipulated the presence of irrel-
evant verbal cues during a vigilance task, in two independent groups (Verbal-cues group 
vs. No-cues group).  
We found that compared to the No-cues group, the Verbal-cues group reported a 
higher amount of MW, mostly triggered by the irrelevant cue-words, and a higher propor-
tion of past-oriented MW compared to the other temporal orientations. These results 
demonstrate that task-irrelevant verbal stimulation increases the frequency of MW and 
steers its temporal orientation toward the past. Implications for the research on MW are 
discussed. 
 
Keywords: mind wandering; task-unrelated thoughts; involuntary autobiographical 
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 While reading a book, driving the car, or attending a class, there may be moments 
when our attention drifts away from an ongoing task toward internal thoughts whose con-
tent is unrelated to the task, like memories or prospective thoughts. We refer to this “shift 
of attention away from a primary task toward internal information” (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006, p. 946) as mind wandering (MW).  
Converging evidence suggests that MW is a ubiquitous and pervasive mental activity, 
common across different cultures and groups (see for a review, Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015). Experience sampling studies have indeed shown that people spend between 25% 
and 50% of their daytime engaged in MW (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010), and the frequency of MW might even increase during well-practiced tasks (e.g., 
driving, reading) (Mason et al., 2007).  
First studied by a handful of researchers almost fifty years ago (Antrobus, Singer, & 
Greenberg, 1966; Klinger, 1971; Singer, 1966), in the past decade MW has received a 
widespread scientific attention in both psychology and neuroscience (Christoff, Irving, 
Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016). In particular, research on MW greatly benefited 
from the adoption of the “strategy of triangulation” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), 
whereby self-reports, behavioral measures, and physiological measures are combined to-
gether, to make inferences about covert mental experiences.  
What still remains unclear, though, is the neurocognitive mechanism by which MW 
arises and unfolds over time, that is why and how the mind wanders. As argued by Small-
wood (2013), any comprehensive account of MW is expected to address and explain the 
process of the initial occurrence of MW as well as its maintenance-continuity over time 
(i.e., the process-occurrence framework; Smallwood, 2013). One of the reasons for the 
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inability to determine the onset of MW is the difficulty in causally linking MW to a pre-
ceding event that triggers the onset of MW (i.e., imperative stimulus; Smallwood, 2013). 
In the MW literature MW episodes have been mainly described as self-generated (e.g., 
Smallwood, 2013) and stimulus-independent (Antrobus, 1968), terms that emphasize their 
independence from external stimuli and ongoing actions.  
However, during the last few years, empirical evidence has been reported suggesting 
for a role of external stimuli in MW (McVay & Kane, 2013; Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavi-
lashvili, 2015; Song & Wang, 2012). For example, in the experience sampling study by 
Song and Wang (2012), in most MW samples (88%) participants could report the trigger 
for the MW and nearly a half was reported to be associated with internal (49%) and half 
with external (51%) cues. 
An important contribution to addressing the question of the onset of MW and its cue-
dependent nature has been recently provided by the related research field on involuntary 
autobiographical memories (IAMs). IAMs are memories of personal events that come to 
mind spontaneously, without any deliberate attempt to retrieve them (Berntsen, 1996, 
1998, 2009; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Mace, 2004, 2005). Crucially, IAMs share 
similar features with MW (Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010; Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & 
Alloy, 2016), as studies have highlighted that these memories are more likely when one is 
engaged in undemanding activities that require little attention and concentration (Berntsen 
& Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). It is also noteworthy that IAMs are largely 
elicited by easily identifiable external cues (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; 
Mace, 2004), generally related to prominent aspects of the remembered experiences (e.g., 
Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004). Direct comparisons between IAMs and involun-
tary future thoughts revealed for both kinds of involuntary cognitions clearly identifiable 
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triggers but IAMs were more likely to be triggered by environmental cues compared to the 
future thoughts (e.g., Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). 
In one of the most successful paradigms, developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili 
(2008) to assess IAMs in a laboratory setting, participants are exposed to a long sequence 
of trials of mostly horizontal lines and have to detect an occasional target (i.e., vertical 
lines), while being simultaneously exposed to irrelevant cue-words, presented in the center 
of each slide (i.e., ‘relaxing on a beach’ or ‘crossing the street’). To assess the frequency 
of IAMs, both self-caught (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) or probe-caught (Vannucci, 
Batool, Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014) procedures have been used in the studies. This para-
digm elicits a fair amount of IAMs, the majority of which (85% in the original study) are 
reported as being triggered by the word-cues on the screen.  
Recently, Plimpton et al. (2015) used a modified version of this paradigm, originally 
developed for studying IAMs, to investigate the association between external cues and the 
frequency and temporal orientation of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). In the study, par-
ticipants were stopped 11 times during the vigilance task and recorded their thoughts at 
that moment. The results revealed that the majority of reported TUTs (86%) had an iden-
tifiable external trigger, and, in most cases (85%), the trigger was one of the verbal cues 
appearing on the screen. As for the temporal orientation of TUTs, the frequency of past-
focused thoughts was significantly higher than future and current thoughts. The cue emo-
tional valence interacted with the temporality of the thoughts, with negative cues being 
more likely to elicit past thoughts, while positive cues being more likely to elicit future 
thoughts. 
These findings suggest that both the frequency and the temporal focus of TUTs may 
be function of the external context, rather than being completely self-generated. Neverthe-
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less, a few caveats are warranted. First, given the absence of a direct experimental manip-
ulation of the presence of verbal cues, it is not possible to conclude that the presence of 
verbal cues was the direct cause of the occurrence of TUTs and the steering of their tem-
poral focus toward the past. Moreover, in the study by Plimpton et al. (2015), the authors 
primarily referred to TUTs as a category comprising both mind wandering and external 
distractions (EDs), while previous taxonomies (i.e., Robison & Unsworth, 2015; Stawar-
czyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016) 
and empirical evidence (i.e., Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) suggested differential effects 
for these two phenomena. 
In the present study, we aimed to capitalize on these recent promising findings, by 
experimentally investigating the causal role of verbal cues in triggering and shaping MW. 
We did so, by addressing two major questions: First, does exposure to task-irrelevant ver-
bal information directly trigger MW during a vigilance task? If so, we should find a higher 
frequency of MW during a vigilance task with verbal cues compared to an identical vigi-
lance task with no verbal cues. This question mirrors the current research agenda on spon-
taneous thought that underlines the crucial importance of tracking the onset of each single 
MW episode (i.e., “why”), rather than simply ascertaining its presence or absence (Small-
wood, 2013).  
Second, does the exposure to verbal information influence the temporal orientation 
of MW and, specifically, increase past-oriented MW? The indirect evidence we reviewed 
above would suggest that the exposure to verbal information stimulate the mind to wander 
toward the past, compared to an identical condition with no verbal information presented. 
However, so far, no studies investigated whether the exposure to verbal information might 
systematically affect the temporal orientation of MW. 
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To address these two questions, in the context of a between-subject design, we ex-
perimentally manipulated the presence of verbal cues during the vigilance task in two in-
dependent groups, “Verbal-cues” group and “No-cues” group respectively.                      
Since evidence has been reported for negative verbal cues being more likely to trigger past 
memories and positive verbal cues to trigger thoughts about the future (Plimpton et al., 
2015), to avoid any bias in favour of a specific temporal focus of MW, all the verbal cues 
employed in the present study had been previously evaluated as emotionally neutral and 
a-temporal (see Methods).  
In the study, a self-catching procedure was used, thereby instructing participants to 
report the occurrence of any spontaneous mental content not directly related to the task at 
hand. In line with the taxonomy proposed by Stawarczyk and colleagues (2011), we dis-
tinguished TUTs in external distractions (ED) and mind wandering (MW) episodes, as 
these two phenomena were shown to have partially distinct associations with attentional 
control and working memory (Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). To our knowledge, it is still 
unknown whether task-irrelevant verbal cues might have differential effects on the fre-
quency of MW and ED. Given the association reported in the literature between past-ori-
ented MW and negative mood (e.g., Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011), positive and negative affect were measured (through the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule, PANAS) at the beginning of the experimental session. Finally, 




Sixty-two undergraduate students from the University of Florence (48 females, age 
range 18–29, M = 21.76 years) volunteered to participate in our study. All participants 
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were Italian native speakers and they had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Half were 
randomly assigned to the Verbal-cues condition (n = 31) and the other half to the No-cues 
condition (n = 31). Groups did not significantly differ in age, gender, and depressive symp-
toms (assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Italian 
adaptation in Ghisi, Flebus, Montano, Sanavio, & Sica, 2006) 
2.2.Materials 
Vigilance task. Participants completed a modified version of the computer-based vig-
ilance task developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and already used in previous 
studies (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016; Vannucci et al., 2014; Vannucci, Pelagatti, 
Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, & Rossi Paccani, 2015). The task consisted of 600 trials, presented 
in a fixed order, each remaining on the screen for 1.5 sec. In each trial an image (approxi-
mately 21.5 cm x 12.5 cm in size) was shown depicting either a pattern of black horizontal 
(non-target stimuli) or black vertical lines (target stimuli). Target stimuli appeared on 12 
trials, with a minimum of 42 and a maximum of 59 trials between each target. In the Ver-
bal-cues condition, cue words (e.g., “stainless steel”, “long hair”, “paper bag”) in 18-CPI 
Arial font were shown in the middle of the image on 108 (18%) trials. The words that 
served as cues were selected from the pool of 800 word-phrases developed by Schlagman 
and Kvavilashvili (2008) and adapted to the Italian sample (for more details on the Italian adap-
tation, see Vannucci et al., 2015). Temporally-oriented word-phrases (e.g., “old family photos”, 
“forgotten appointment”) were not included in the sample and, when necessary, the words were 
slightly modified to make them emotionally neutral (e.g., “jealous behaviour“ was replaced by 
“behaviour”). Moreover, to verify that the selected cues were actually neutral and a-temporal we 
asked eight independent judges to evaluate for each word the emotional valence (positive, neg-
ative or neutral) and the temporal focus, that is whether the word was commonly used in daily 
life and linked to a specific temporal orientation (i.e., past, present, future), more than one (i.e., 
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mixed), or to no specific temporal orientation (i.e., a-temporal). Only the words evaluated as 
neutral and a-temporal by at least 6 out of 8 judges (i.e., 75%) were selected for the study.  
Thought questionnaire: After completing the vigilance task, participants provided de-
tails of their mental contents on a questionnaire. First, they were asked to indicate the temporal 
orientation of each mental content, distinguishing among “past”, “present”, “future”, and “a-tem-
poral”. Participants were told that an “a-temporal” mental content refers to every thought with no 
specific temporal orientation (i.e., I am a very anxious person; I like very much eating pizza) 
whereas a “present” mental content refers to every thought related either to something occurring 
here and now (i.e., I miss my dog, that is now with my boyfriend) or to something occurring in the 
current period of life (i.e., I don’t get along with my mother in this period). Moreover, they were 
asked to specify for each event (i) whether it was general or specific and (ii) whether it was 
self-related or not. At the end of this short questionnaire they were also asked to rate on a 
5-point scale their overall level of concentration (1 = not at all concentrated; 5 = fully 
concentrated) and boredom (1 = not at all; 5 = very bored) experienced during the task.  
Mood questionnaires: At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were 
asked to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - State (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Italian adaptation in Terracciano, McCrae, & Costa, 2003). The 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule consists of two 10-item self-report scales, one 
measuring positive affect (i.e., excited, inspired) and the other one measuring negative 
affect (i.e., upset, irritable). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = 
very slightly or not at all, to 5 = extremely), and it measures the extent to which each mood 
state has been experienced during a specified time frame. In the study participants filled 
out the PANAS form with “the present moment” instructions.  
2.3.Procedure 
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Participants were tested individually. After being welcomed into the laboratory, par-
ticipants were briefly introduced to the research project, presented as a study examining 
concentration and its correlates, and they were asked to complete the PANAS. Once this 
was completed, they received the instructions for the vigilance task. In this task they were 
asked to detect target stimuli (vertical lines) among a large number of non-target stimuli 
(horizontal lines), by saying “yes” out loud each time they detected a target stimulus. Par-
ticipants in the Verbal-cues condition were also told that they would see words in some of 
the trials. They were told that they were not supposed to do anything with these words. It 
was explained that the condition they were taking part in was looking at how people could 
keep their concentration on the patterns and that in another condition participants would 
have to concentrate on the words. Participants were informed that the task was quite mo-
notonous and that task-unrelated mental contents (e.g., thoughts, plans, considerations, 
past events, images, etc.) could pop into their mind spontaneously during the task. If some-
thing came to their mind during the vigilance task, they should click the mouse to interrupt 
the presentation and write a brief description of the mental content and to indicate whether 
it was triggered by internal thoughts, an element in the environment, a word on the screen 
(for the Verbal-cues group only; participants were asked to specify the word) or no cue. 
This initial description should be sufficient for them to identify the mental content at a 
later point in time, if necessary. After the instructions, participants were given a short prac-
tice of the vigilance task. As in the experimental session, they were allowed to stop the 
presentation if they had any task-unrelated thoughts. When the vigilance task was over, 
they were presented with the brief descriptions of their mental contents and asked to com-
plete a brief questionnaire (thought questionnaire). The total session lasted from approxi-
mately 60 to 75 min. 
 




3.1. Performance on vigilance task 
All 62 participants successfully completed the vigilance task. Only one participant 
(in the No-cues group) reported a mistake (omission). There were no significant differ-
ences between the two groups with respect to the level of concentration experienced during 
the task (p = .64, d = 0.12), but the No-cues group reported higher levels of boredom 
compared to the Verbal-cues group (p = .008, d = 0.70) (see Table 1). 
3.2. Mood  
All participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) at 
the beginning of the experimental session. The two groups did not significantly differ in 
either Positive (p = .96, d = 0.01) or Negative Affect Schedule (p = .48, d = 0.18) (see 
Table 1).  
3.3. The role of verbal cues in mind-wandering  
Before conducting the data analyses on the mental contents, all thoughts recorded by 
participants were independently coded by the authors as either task-related or task-unre-
lated. Task-related contents consisted of any reference to some task features or to the par-
ticipant’s overall performance (i.e., thoughts about the experiment’s duration or the num-
ber of target stimuli successfully detected), whereas task-unrelated mental contents did not 
include references to the task at hand (see Plimpton et al., 2015) and included “external 
distraction” (ED) and “mind wandering” (MW) (see Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Catale, & D' Argembeau, 2014). 
Task-unrelated mental contents were coded as ED, when the participant's attention 
was focused on stimuli that were present in the current environment but unrelated to the 
task at hand. This category comprised all thoughts whose content was focused on current 
sensory perceptions unrelated to the task, with the origin of these perceptions being either 
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external or internal (i.e., bodily sensations). Task-unrelated mental contents were coded as 
MW when participants had their attention decoupled from the current environment and 
they were experiencing thoughts unrelated to the task at hand. The MW episodes may have 
been triggered by external or internal cues. For both categorizations, inter-rater reliability 
between the coders was very good (categorization of task-related vs. task-unrelated con-
tents, Kappa = .93, SE = .02; categorization of MW vs. ED reports, Kappa = .91, SE = .03) 
and minor disagreements were solved by discussion. Of the 62 participants, one outlier (in 
the Verbal-cues group) was excluded from the analyses because of the very high frequency 
with which reported MW episodes.  
Sixty-one participants reported a total of 444 mental contents, 77 were classed as 
task-related (M = 1.26, SD = 1.40 per participant) and 367 as task-unrelated mental con-
tents (M = 6.02, SD = 4.79). Out of 367 task-unrelated contents, 324 were classed as MW 
reports (M = 5.31, SD = 4.70, range 0-20) and 43 as ED reports (M = 0.70, SD = 1.05, 
range = 0-4). Since we were interested in task-unrelated thoughts, task-related thoughts 
were not further considered in our analyses.  
To assess the effects of the experimental manipulation of cues on the two types of 
task-unrelated mental contents (i.e., MW and ED), we calculated the average number of 
MW and ED reports per person and entered them into a 2 (Group: No-cues vs. Verbal-
cues) x 2 (Type of task-unrelated mental contents: MW vs. ED) mixed ANCOVA, with 
boredom as covariate. Descriptive data (means and standard deviations) as a function of 
group are reported in Table 2. 
Results showed a significant main effect of Group F (1, 58) = 8.73, p = .005, 2 = 
0.07, with the Verbal-cues group reporting a higher amount of task-unrelated mental con-
tents (M = 3.94) compared to the No-cues group (M = 2.11), and a significant main effect 
of the Type of task-unrelated thoughts, F (1, 58) = 8.35, p = .005, 2 = 0.06, as MW reports 
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(M = 5.35) outnumbered ED (M = 0.70) reports. However, the main effects were qualified 
by a significant Group by Type of task-unrelated mental contents interaction, F (1, 58) = 
14.70, p < .0005, 2 = 0.11: the Verbal-cues group reported a higher amount of MW (M = 
7.40) compared to No-cues group (M = 3.30, p < .005, d = 0.91). The difference between 
the two groups in the amount of ED was not significant (Verbal-cues: M = 0.49 vs. No-
cues: M = 0.92, p = .09, d = 0.45).  
Globally, these results suggest that the incorporation of verbal cues into the vigilance 
task increases the amount of MW experienced during the task. To further investigate the 
contribution of the verbal cues in triggering MW, in the Verbal-cues group we examined 
the number of MW episodes reported to be triggered by word-phrases (cues), internal 
thoughts, environmental stimuli, and no trigger.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with Type of trigger as independent variable 
was performed on these values. Results showed a significant effect of Type of trigger, F 
(1.4, 41.3) = 23.92, p < .000005, 2 = 0.33. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjust-
ment showed that the mean number of MW reports triggered by word-phrases (M = 4.37) 
was significantly higher than those triggered by internal thoughts (M = 1.57, p < .0005, d 
= 1.09), environmental stimuli (M = 0.33, p < .00005, d = 1.21) and by no trigger (M = 
1.00, p < .0005, d = 1.03). Moreover, the mean number of MW reports triggered by envi-
ronmental stimuli was significantly lower than those triggered by internal thoughts (p 
< .005, d = 0.82) and by no trigger (p < .05, d = 0.63). 
3.4. Temporal focus of mind wandering and verbal cues 
At the end of the vigilance task, participants coded each of their recorded thoughts as 
past memories, future thoughts, thoughts about a current situation or a-temporal thoughts. 
Out of the 324 MW reports, 127 (39.2%) were classified as past memories, 81 (25%) as 
future thoughts, 38 as present thoughts (11.7%) and 78 (24.1%) as a-temporal thoughts. In 
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the Verbal-cues group, out of 218 MW episodes, 97 (44.5%) were classed as past memo-
ries, 40 (18.3%) as future thoughts, 23 (10.6%) as present thoughts and 58 (26.6%) as a-
temporal thoughts. In the No-cues group, out of 106 MW episodes, 30 (28.3%) were 
classed as memories, 41 (38.7%) as future thoughts, 15 (14.1%) as present thoughts and 
20 (18.9%) as a-temporal thoughts. 
To assess the effects of the experimental manipulation on the temporal focus of MW, 
the mean proportion of each type of thought (past, present, future and a-temporal) was 
calculated per person and entered into a 2 (Group: Verbal-cues vs. No-cues) x 4 (Temporal 
focus: past, present, future, and a-temporal) mixed ANOVA.  
The analysis was carried out on participants who reported at least 3 thoughts, and the 
epsilon correction for the degrees of freedom suggested by Greer and Dunlap (1997) was 
used to take into account that, for each participant, the sum of the values (proportion) 
across the conditions of the temporal focus factor is constant, namely 1. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Temporal focus, F (2.6, 99.2) = 
8.08, p < .0005, 2 = 0.18. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment indicated that 
the proportion of present (M = .12) was significantly lower than past (M = .35, p < .0001, 
d = 0.94) and future (M = .30, p < .005, d = 0.69). The Group x Type of temporal focus 
interaction was also significant, F (2.6, 99.2) = 5.53, p < .005, 2 = 0.13. The Verbal-cues 
group reported a higher proportion of past events compared to No-cues group (M = .45 vs. 
M = .26, p < .01, d = 0.53) and a lower proportion of future events (M = .20 vs. M = .40, p 
< .01, d = 0.52). In the Verbal-cues group the proportion of past events (M = .45) was 
significantly higher than present thoughts (M = .09, p < .000005, d = 1.10), future thoughts 
(M = .20, p < .05, d = 0.56) and a-temporal thoughts (M = .26, p < .05, d = 0.54), and the 
proportion of a-temporal thoughts was significantly higher than present thought (p < .05, 
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d = 0.61). In the No-cues group the proportion of future thoughts (M = .40) was signifi-
cantly higher than present thoughts (M = .15, p < .05, d = 0.62) (Figure 1). 
These data suggest that the exposure to verbal cues affected the temporal orientation 
of MW. To further investigate this aspect, we ran a secondary analysis limited to the MW 
episodes that participants reported as being triggered by the verbal cues and examined the 
mean proportion of each type of temporal focus (past, present, future and a-temporal) cal-
culated over the total amount of MW triggered by the verbal cues. 
The analysis was carried out on participants who reported at least 3 episodes of MW, 
and the epsilon correction for the degrees of freedom suggested by Greer and Dunlap 
(1997) was used to take into account that, for each participant, the sum of the values (pro-
portion) across the conditions of the temporal focus factor is constant (i.e., 1).The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Temporal focus, F (1.71, 36.1) = 15.35, p < .00005, 
2 = 0.42. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment indicated that the proportion 
of past (M = .50) was significantly higher than the proportion of present (M = .08, p 
< .000005, d = 1.75) and future (M = .09, p <.00005, d = 1.56). The proportion of a-tem-
poral (M = .32) was significantly higher than the proportion of present (p < .05, d = 0.83) 
and future (p < .05, d = 0.75) and it did not significantly differ from the proportion of past 
(p = 0.65, d = 0.42).  
3.5. Phenomenological properties of mind wandering  
At the end of the vigilance task, participants were asked to specify for each event 
whether it was general or specific, and whether it was self-related or not. Out of 324 MW 
reports, 182 (56.2%) were classed as specific and 248 (76.5%) were classed as self-related. 
In the Verbal-cues group, out of 218 MW reports, 118 (54.1%) were classed as specific 
and 167 (76.6%) as self-related. In the No-cues groups, out of 106 MW reports, 64 (60.4%) 
were classed as specific and 81 (76.4%) were classed as self-related.  
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To assess whether the presence of verbal cues affected these two phenomenological 
qualities of MW, we calculated for each participant the proportion of specific MW epi-
sodes and the proportion of self-related MW episodes. Descriptive data (means and stand-
ard deviations) as a function of group are reported in Table 2. 
Two independent sample t-tests were performed to compare specific MW episodes 
and self-related MW episodes between No-cues and Verbal-Cues groups.  
T-tests did not reveal any significant difference between the two groups in the mean 
proportion of specific MW episodes (p = .78, d = 0.07) or in the mean proportion of self-
related mental contents (p = .80, d = 0.07).  
 
4.Discussion 
The present study aimed at investigating the causal role of the exposure to verbal 
cues, in triggering and shaping MW. To this aim, we used a vigilance task already suc-
cessfully used to induce and assess MW in the laboratory (Plimpton et al., 2015) and we 
investigated, in a between-subject design, the effects of the exposure to task-irrelevant 
word-phrases on the rate of MW and its temporal orientation. The results of the study 
showed that the exposure to verbal cues positively affects the rate of reported MW, with a 
significantly higher number of MW episodes reported by the Verbal-cues group compared 
to the No-cues group. Moreover, the Verbal-cues group reported a higher proportion of 
past-oriented MW compared to the other temporal orientations.  
Globally, these results provide an important contribution to identifying the conditions 
of naturally occurring episodes of MW. One of the crucial findings emerging from the 
MW literature is that the frequency of MW depends heavily on the attentional demands of 
the ongoing task. The rate of MW is reduced whenever attentional load is increased, such 
as in tasks requiring a substantial involvement of the attentional processes operating within 
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the working memory system (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Teasdale et al., 
1995) or focused attention (e.g., manipulation of perceptual load, Forster & Lavie, 2009). 
Our results demonstrate that both the frequency of MW and its temporal focus can 
be also manipulated by systematically modifying the external context. Moreover, by as-
sessing separately MW and ED, we could show that only MW increased under the expo-
sure to verbal cues. This pattern of results confirms previous studies showing that MW and 
ED are two partially distinct processes, that can be differentiated at the behavioural (Sta-
warczyk et al., 2014; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and physiological level (e.g. pupillary 
correlates in Unsworth & Robison, 2016). 
Our findings also give an important contribution to our understanding of the mecha-
nisms underlying MW and they have implications at both theoretical and methodological 
level. First, the higher amount of MW shown by the Verbal-cues group demonstrates that 
MW is a cue-dependent phenomenon and that the external context can stimulate the so-
called “process of ignition” of MW (Smallwood, 2013). So far, most of the research on 
MW has not considered the potential contribution of the external stimuli as trigger for the 
MW. In fact, MW episodes are often described as “stimulus-independent thoughts” (An-
trobus et al., 1966) or “self-generated thoughts” (Smallwood, 2013), despite the fact that 
early studies acknowledged the triggering role of external cues (Varendock, 1921). Alter-
natively, it is possible to speculate that in a vigilance task the presence of distractors may 
reduce participants’ attention and make them more susceptible to MW. Although this ex-
planation appears to be in line with previous evidence showing that people with worse 
performance on attentional tasks are more prone to experience MW (Hu, He, & Xu, 2012), 
our results do not seem to support such a scenario. The Verbal-cues and the No-cues groups 
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did not differ with respect to their level of concentration and the amount of external dis-
traction, whereas the amount of MW was markedly greater in the Verbal-cues group than 
in the control group.   
Second, the majority of the experimental paradigms and sampling procedures cur-
rently used to investigate MW allow for detecting whether MW is taking place but they do 
not enable researchers to identify the events that lead to the initiation of MW and to dis-
tinguish between its onset and maintenance over time. For example, in many studies on 
MW, a go/no go task involving very simple stimuli (i.e., digits, meaningless letter strings) 
has been used, without any other meaningful external stimuli, therefore reducing the pos-
sibility of any context-triggered experience of MW. Moreover, the experience sampling 
procedures that are often used (i.e., self-caught and probe-caught; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006) do not include any assessment of the potential triggers of the MW episodes thereby 
overshadowing the relative contribution of the external environment and internal processes 
(e.g., thoughts, emotions) to MW. Only recently, a few studies have started addressing the 
question of the cue-dependent nature of MW, by assessing the triggers of MW episodes 
(Song & Wang, 2012) and incorporating meaningful cues into a monotonous vigilance 
task (McVay & Kane, 2013; Plimpton et al., 2015). 
Third, the incorporation of verbal cues into the vigilance task increases the frequency 
of MW experienced during the task and affects its temporal orientation, specifically facil-
itating past-oriented MW. Previous studies on the temporal orientation of MW have shown 
that, although robust evidence indicates a prospective bias in MW (Baird, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, et al., 2011), specific factors, such as 
negative mood, cognitive load, and familiarity may affect the temporal orientation of MW 
(Baird et al., 2011; Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2011; Smallwood, Nind, & 
O’Connor, 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). The retrospective bias reported in the 
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present study by the Verbal-cues group is consistent with the evidence coming from direct 
comparisons between involuntary memories and involuntary future thoughts (Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008): although both involuntary memories and involuntary future events were 
found to be mainly triggered by clearly identifiable cues, external cues were more frequent 
for involuntary memories than for involuntary future events (52% vs. 34% in Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008). In a similar vein, in a very recent study on MW in elderly and young 
adults, Maillet and Schacter (2016b) found that environmental stimuli (cues) primarily 
triggered past-oriented thoughts. These results are consistent with the fact that, compared 
to memories, involuntary future thinking is related to and triggered primarily by current 
concerns, being less dependent from external stimulation (Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Klinger, 
2013). In sum, there is increasing evidence suggesting the “[…] possibility that autobio-
graphical associations with the current task environment have a potential to cue the dis-
interested mind” (Smallwood et al., 2009, p.118). 
In keeping with this, involuntary memories are also more sensitive to the type of the 
task-irrelevant external cues (i.e., verbal vs. pictorial) compared to other spontaneous task-
unrelated thoughts (Mazzoni, Vannucci, & Batool, 2014). Specifically, in the study by 
Mazzoni et al. (2014) more IAMs were elicited when verbal cues were presented during 
the task, rather than pictorial cues, whereas there was no significant difference between 
the effects of verbal and pictorial cues on the non-memory contents. As recently suggested 
by Maillet and Schacter (2016b), the strong association between environmental cues and 
past-events might be a very important adaptive mechanism that helps people relate the 
current environment to similar situations experienced in the past and this might support 
appropriate behavior (Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013). 
Some limitations of the present study as well as suggestions for future developments 
should be also considered. Our data makes a compelling case for the role of external cues 
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in MW. However, the exact mechanism by which the exposure to cues of verbal nature 
facilitates MW and steers it toward the past, still remains to be established. Such an effect 
in fact could possibly be due to either the mere presence of distractors, or the exposure to 
semantically meaningful cues. Interestingly, previous literature suggests that not all the 
distractors are the same in facilitating task-unrelated mental activity, with verbal cues be-
ing more effective in inducing IAMs than pictorial cues (Mazzoni et al., 2014). Hence, 
future investigations should systematically manipulate the nature of the distractors in vig-
ilance tasks and clarify their influence on the frequency and phenomenology of MW.      
Moreover, in our study MW was assessed by using a self-catching procedure, in 
which participants were asked to interrupt the task whenever they became aware of any 
task-unrelated mental contents and to report them. With this procedure, people necessarily 
report only task-unrelated thoughts of which they are aware, therefore focusing the inves-
tigation on mental contents that are sufficiently activated to pass the awareness threshold. 
Besides, by adopting a self-catching procedure, we cannot rule out that the presence of 
verbal cues broke up the flow of thought inducing participants to be aware that their mind 
was wandering off, and, in turn, to report more MW episodes. Future studies might use a 
probe-catching method instead of the self-catching method employed here and assess 
whether and how the presence of external cues might affect the level of awareness of the 
mental state of MW (e.g., aware vs. unaware mind-wandering, in Christoff, Gordon, Small-
wood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009). However, although legitimate, this concern is mitigated 
by the fact that our findings are consistent with the ones reported by Plimpton et al. (2015), 
regardless the methodological differences between the two studies, such as the assessment 
method (self-catching vs. probe-catching), cue valence (only neutral vs. neutral, positive 
and negative) and cue rate (few cues vs. many cues). 
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Future studies should further examine the association between mind wandering and 
boredom. In our study, the No-cues group retrospectively reported a higher level of bore-
dom experienced during the task compared to the Verbal-cues group, but no significant 
differences in the level of concentration. Whereas empirical work on the association be-
tween attention and boredom has largely focused on boredom proneness or trait boredom 
(e.g., Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Hunter & 
Eastwood, 2016; Isacescu, Struk, & Danckert, 2016), the few studies which investigated 
state boredom reported a positive association with poor sustained attention and mind wan-
dering (Carriere et al., 2008; Hunter & Eastwood, 2016). However, the precise nature of 
this association has yet to be clarified and specifically the connection between state bore-
dom and mind wandering both assessed “on-line” (during the task) deserves future inves-
tigation.  
The identification of the events that directly cause and control the occurrence of MW 
provide an important contribution to addressing the question of “when” the mind starts 
wandering and “why” it starts at that moment in time. However, MW does not occur upon 
each encounter with a stimulus. One might argue for the existence of a gating mechanism 
which regulates the onset of a MW episode triggered by an external event, like a word-
phrase presented on the screen (see for a similar discussion on IAMs, Kompus, 2011). 
Future studies are needed to examine whether the onset of a spontaneous MW episode is 
foreshadowed in the neural activity up to a few seconds before the presentation of the 
external cue which is, subjectively, reported to have triggered the MW. 
Finally, we investigated the effects of verbal cues on the experience of MW in a 
sample of young adults. Future studies should investigate these effects in other populations 
of special interest for research on MW, such as elderly people. Studies on aging have 
shown a reduction in MW in healthy older adults compared to young adults (see for a 
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discussion, Maillet & Schacter, 2016a), and an age-related increase in reliance on the en-
vironment (Craik, 1986; Maillet & Schacter, 2016b). Future studies should examine the 
effects of the exposure to task-irrelevant verbal cues on the frequency and temporal orien-
tation of MW in elderly people and verify whether the presence of external cues might 
increase the frequency of engagement in MW in elderly people, to a stronger extent than 
in young adults.  
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Barzykowski, K., & Niedźwieńska, A. (2016). The effects of instruction on the frequency 
and characteristics of involuntary autobiographical memories. PLoS ONE, 11(6), 
e0157121. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157121 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inven-
tory-II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Berntsen, D. (1996). Involuntary autobiographical memories. Applied Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, 10(5), 435–454. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199610)10:5<435::AID-
ACP408>3.0.CO;2-L 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
23 
Berntsen, D. (1998). Voluntary and involuntary access to autobiographical memory. 
Memory, 6(2), 113–141. doi:10.1080/741942071 
Berntsen, D. (2009). Involuntary autobiographical memories. An introduction to the un-
bidden past. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511575921 
Berntsen, D., & Hall, N. M. (2004). The episodic nature of involuntary autobiographical 
memories. Memory & Cognition, 32(5), 789–803. doi:10.3758/BF03195869 
Berntsen, D., & Jacobsen, A. S. (2008). Involuntary (spontaneous) mental time travel into 
the past and future. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(4), 1093–1104. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.001 
Carriere, J. S., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2008). Everyday attention lapses and memory 
failures: the affective consequences of mindlessness. Consciousness and Cognition 
17(3), 835–847. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.008 
Cheyne, J.A., Carriere, J. S., & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: lapses of conscious 
awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(3), 
578–592. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.009 
Christoff, K., Gordon A. M., Smallwood J., Smith R., & Schooler J. W. (2009). Experience 
sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions 
to mind wandering. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 106(21), 8719–8724. doi:10.1073/pnas.0900234106 
Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N., & Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016). 
Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: A dynamic framework. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 17(11), 718–731. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.113 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
24 
Cole, S. N., & Berntsen, D. (2015). Do future thoughts reflect personal goals? Current 
concerns and mental time travel into the past and future. Quarterly Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology, 69(2), 273–284. doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1044542 
Craik, F. I. M. (1986). A functional account of age differences in memory. In F. Klix & H. 
Hagendorf (Eds.), Human memory and cognitive capabilities: Mechanisms and per-
formances (pp. 409–422). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2009). Harnessing the wandering mind: the role of perceptual 
load. Cognition, 111(3), 345–355. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.006 
Ghisi, M., Flebus, G. B., Montano, A., Sanavio, E., & Sica, C. (2006). Beck Depression 
Inventory-II. Manuale italiano. Firenze: Organizzazioni Speciali. 
Greer, T., & Dunlap, W. P. (1997). Analysis of variance with ipsative measures. Psycho-
logical Methods, 2(2), 200–207. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.2.2.200 
Hu, N., He, S., & Xu, B. (2012). Different efficiencies of attentional orienting in different 
wandering minds. Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (1), 139–148. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.007 
Hunter, A., & Eastwood, J. D. (2016). Does state boredom cause failures of attention? 
Examining the relations between trait boredom, state boredom, and sustained atten-
tion. Experimental Brain Research, doi:10.1007/s00221-016-4749-7 
Isacescu, J., Struk, A. A., & Danckert, A. (2016). Cognitive and affective predictors of 
boredom proneness. Cognition and Emotion, doi:10.1080/02699931.2016.1259995 
Johannessen, K. B., & Berntsen, D. (2010). Current concerns in involuntary and voluntary 
autobiographical memories. Consciousness and Cognition, 19(4), 847–860. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.01.009  
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. 
(2007). For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study of 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
25 
working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 18(7), 
614–621. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01948.x 
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. 
Science, 330, 932. doi:10.1126/science.1192439 
Klinger, E. (1971). Structure and functions of fantasy. New York, NY: John Wiley.  
Klinger, E. (2013). Goal commitments and the content of thoughts and dreams: Basic prin-
ciples. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 415. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00415. eCollection 
2013. 
Kompus, K. (2011). Default mode networks gates the retrieval of task-irrelevant incidental 
memories. Neuroscience Letters, 487, 318–321. doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2010.10.047. 
Kvavilashvili, L., & Mandler, G. (2004). Out of one’s mind: A study of involuntary se-
mantic memories. Cognitive Psychology, 48(1), 47–94. doi:10.1016/S0010-
0285(03)00115-4 
Levinson, D. B., Smallwood, J., & Davidson, R. (2012). The persistence of thought: evi-
dence for a role of working memory in the maintenance of task-unrelated thinking. 
Psychological Science, 23, 375–380. doi:10.1177/0956797611431465 
Mace, J. H. (2004). Involuntary autobiographical memories are highly dependent on ab-
stract cuing: The Proustian view is incorrect. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18(7), 
893–899. doi:10.1002/acp.1020 
Mace, J. H. (2005). Priming involuntary autobiographical memories. Memory, 13(8), 874–
884. doi:10.1080/09658210444000485 
Maillet, D., & Schacter, D. L. (2016a). From mind wandering to involuntary retrieval: 
Age-related differences in spontaneous cognitive processes. Neuropsychologia, 80, 
142–156. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.11.017 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
26 
Maillet, D., & Schacter, D. L. (2016b). When the mind wanders: Distinguishing stimulus-
dependent from stimulus-independent thoughts during incidental encoding in young 
and older adults. Psychology and Aging, 31(4), 370–379. doi: 10.1037/pag0000099. 
Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H. W., Klinger, E., & Alloy, L. B. (2016). Spontaneous thought 
and vulnerability to mood disorders: The dark side of the wandering mind. Clinical 
Psychological Science, 4(5), 835–857. doi:10.1177/2167702615622383 
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, 
C. N. (2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent 
thought. Science, 315, 393–395. doi:10.1126/science.1131295  
Mazzoni, G., Vannucci, M., & Batool, I. (2014). Manipulating cues in involuntary autobi-
ographical memory: verbal cues are more effective than pictorial cues. Memory and 
Cognition, 42, 1076–1085. doi:10.3758/s13421-014-0420-3. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2013). Dispatching the wandering mind? Toward a la-bora-
tory method for cuing “spontaneous” off-task thought. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
570. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00570 
Plimpton, B., Patel, P., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2015). Role of triggers and dysphoria in mind-
wandering about past, present and future: A laboratory study. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 33, 261–276. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.014 
Poerio, G., Totterdell, P., & Miles, E. (2013). Mind-wandering and negative mood: does 
one thing really lead to another? Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1412-1421. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2013.09.012.  
Preston, A. R., & Eichenbaum, H. (2013). Interplay of hippocampus and prefrontal cortex 
in memory. Current Biology, 23, R764–R773. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2013.05.041. 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
27 
Robison, M. K., & Unsworth, N. (2015). Working memory capacity offers resistance to 
mind-wandering and external distraction in a context specific manner. Applied Cog-
nitive Psychology, 29, 680–690. doi:10.1002/acp.3150 
 Schlagman, S., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2008). Involuntary autobiographical memories in and 
outside the laboratory: How different are they from voluntary autobiographical 
memories? Memory & Cognition, 36(5), 920–932. doi:10.3758/MC.36.5.920 
Singer, J. L. (1966). Daydreaming. An introduction to the experimental study of inner ex-
perience. New York: Random House. 
Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: A process-occur-
rence framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychological Bulletin, 139(3), 
519–535. doi:10.1037/a0030010 
Smallwood, J., Nind, L., & O’Connor, R. C. (2009). When is your head at? An exploration 
of the factors associated with the temporal focus of the wandering mind. Conscious-
ness and Cognition, 18(1), 118–125. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.11.004 
Smallwood, J., & O’Connor, R. C. (2011). Imprisoned by the past: Unhappy moods lead 
to a retrospective bias to mind wandering. Cognition and Emotion, 25(8), 1481–
1490. doi:10.1080/02699931.2010.545263 
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 
132(6), 946–958. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.946 
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2015). The science of mind wandering: Empirically 
navigating the stream of consciousness. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 487–518. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015331 
Smallwood, J., Schooler, J. W., Turk, D. J., Cunningham, S. J., Burns, P., & Macrae, C. 
N. (2011). Self-reflection and the temporal focus of the wandering mind. Conscious-
ness and Cognition, 20(4), 1120–1126. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.017  
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
28 
Song, X., & Wang, X. (2012). Mind wandering in Chinese daily lives – An experience 
sampling study. PLoS ONE, 7(9), e44423. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044423 
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Catale, C., & D' Argembeau, A. (2014). Relationships be-
tween mind-wandering and attentional control abilities in young adults and adoles-
cents. Acta Psychologica, 148, 25–26. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.01.007 
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Maj, M., Van der Linden, M., & D’Argembeau, A. (2011). 
Mind-wandering: Phenomenology and function as assessed with a novel experience 
sampling method. Acta Psychologica, 136(3), 370–381. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.01.002 
Teasdale, J. D., Dritschel, B. H., Taylor, M. J., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A., Nimmo-Smith, 
I., & Baddeley, A. D. (1995). Stimulus-independent thought depends on central ex-
ecutive resources. Memory & Cognition, 23(5), 551–559. doi:10.3758/BF03197257 
Terracciano A., McCrae R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2003). Factorial and construct validity of 
the Italian Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). European Journal of 
Psychological Assessment, 19(2), 131–141. doi:10.1027//1015-5759.19.2.131 
Unsworth, N., & McMillan, B. D. (2014). Similarities and differences between mind-wan-
dering and external distraction: A latent variable analysis of lapses of attention and 
their relation to cognitive abilities. Acta Psychologica, 150, 14–25. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.04.001 
Unsworth, N., & Robison, M. K. (2016). Pupillary correlates of lapses of sustained atten-
tion. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 16(4), 601–615. 
doi:10.3758/s13415-016-0417-4 
Vannucci, M., Batool, I., Pelagatti, C., & Mazzoni, G. (2014). Modifying the frequency 
and characteristics of involuntary autobiographical memories. PLoS ONE, 9(4), 
e89582. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089582 
Running head: Role of verbal cues in mind wandering   
 
29 
Vannucci, M., Pelagatti, C., Hanczakowski, M., Mazzoni, G., & Rossi Paccani, C. (2015). 
Why are we not flooded by involuntary autobiographical memories? Few cues are 
more effective than many. Psychological Research, 79(6), 1077–1085. 
doi:10.1007/s00426-014-0632-y 
Varendonck, J. (1921). The psychology of daydreams. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063–1070. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
 
  




Fig.1 Mean proportion of past-focused, present-focused, future-focused, and a-tem-
poral mind wandering in the Verbal-cues and No-cues groups 
  





Means, standard deviations, results of significance tests, and effect sizes of the comparison of Verbal cues (n = 31) and No-cues (n = 31) on con-
centration rating, boredom rating, and Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scores. 
 
Variable 
Verbal cues  No-cues 
t df p d 
M SD  M SD 
Vigilance task          
Concentration rating 3.55 0.81  3.45 0.81 0.47 60 .64 0.12 
Boredom rating 2.84 1.16  3.65 1.14 2.76 60 .01 0.70 
          
Mood          
PANAS-Positive score 30.97 5.27  30.90 5.48 0.05 60 .96 0.01 
PANAS-Negative score 13.16 4.20  12.52 2.73 0.72 60 .48 0.18 
 
Note: M = mean: SD = standard deviation; t and df = t-value and degrees of freedom, respectively, from the independent sample t-test; p = p-value; d = Cohen's effect size for 
independent-sample mean comparisons. 
 
  





Means and standard deviations of task-unrelated thoughts reported (mind wandering and ex-
ternal distractions) and phenomenological properties of MW episodes (specificity and self-
relatedness) as a function of group (Verbal cues and No-cues). 
 
Variable 
Verbal cues  No-cues 
M SD  M SD 
Task-unrelated thoughts      
Mind-wandering (MW) 7.27 5.51  3.42 2.69 
External distractions (EDs) 0.33 0.61  1.06 1.26 
      
Phenomenological properties of MW      
Specificity (proportion) .62 .23  .65 .34 
Self-relatedness (proportion) .78 .18  .79 .22 
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Figure 1 
 
 
